Subjective situations and logical omniscience

Studia Logica 72 (1):7-29 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The beliefs of the agents in a multi-agent system have been formally modelled in the last decades using doxastic logics. The possible worlds model and its associated Kripke semantics provide an intuitive semantics for these logics, but they commit us to model agents that are logically omniscient. We propose a way of avoiding this problem, using a new kind of entities called subjective situations. We define a new doxastic logic based on these entities and we show how the belief operators have some desirable properties, while avoiding logical omniscience. A comparison with two well-known proposals (Levesque's logic of explicit and implicit beliefs and Thijsse's hybrid sieve systems) is also provided.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,322

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Non-Ideal Epistemic Spaces.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2010 - Dissertation, Australian National University
Using abstract resources to control reasoning.Richard W. Weyhrauch, Marco Cadoli & Carolyn L. Talcott - 1998 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (1):77-101.
Hintikka and Cresswell on Logical Omniscience.Mark Jago - 2006 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (3):325-354.
Belief revision in a temporal framework.Giacomo Bonanno - 2008 - In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press.
Imagine the possibilities: information without overload.Mark Jago - 2006 - Logique Et Analyse 49 (196):345–371.
Epistemic logic for rule-based agents.Mark Jago - 2009 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):131-158.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
48 (#322,994)

6 months
5 (#652,053)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references