Princípio de razão e o “conhecimento das causas”: pensamento, representação e a possibilidade de saber em geral

Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 57 (2):163-193 (2012)
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Abstract

This essay starts at the well-known thesis according to which ‘to know something is to know its cause’, its reason. Not disagreeing with that at all, we mean to set the proper domain and reaching of the thesis once considering its limitations and effects for modern and contemporary way of thinking. Does may human thought be just representation, or not? If it does not, the thesis will actually make philosophers stay away from the originary pathos as we may show. If it does, what it is left to think about but mind productions?

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