Neurath’s Opposition To Tarskian Semantics

Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 6:165-178 (1999)
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Abstract

The Vienna Circle’s relations to Polish Semantics comprise a rather large spectrum that reaches from Camap’s whole-hearted reception, Gödel’s partial anticipation that Neurath would completely reject semantics. According to Neurath, semantics was of no help for the empiricist program of the Vienna Circle. Quite the contrary, Neurath seems to have regarded Tarski as a sort of evil genius who led astray his closest philosophical friend Carnap, seducing him to leave the path of empiricist virtue and to become addicted to the vice of Aristotelian metaphysics

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Thomas Mormann
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München (PhD)

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