Denying the doctrine and changing the subject

Journal of Philosophy 70 (15):503-510 (1973)
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Abstract

I discuss Quine's claim that anyone denying what we now take to be a logical truth would be using logical words in a novel way. I trace this to a confusions between outright denial and failure to assert, and assertion of a negation. (This abstract is written from memory decades after the article.)

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Author's Profile

Adam Morton
PhD: Princeton University; Last affiliation: University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

Change of Logic, Change of Meaning.Jared Warren - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):421-442.
Quine and Slater on paraconsistency and deviance.Francesco Paoli - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (5):531-548.
The philosophy of alternative logics.Andrew Aberdein & Stephen Read - 2011 - In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The development of modern logic. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 613-723.
Sentence connectives in formal logic.Lloyd Humberstone - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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