Desert and distributive justice in a theory of justice

Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (1):131–143 (2002)
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Some writers think that John Rawls rejects desert as a distributive criterion because he thinks that people are not capable of deserving anything. I argue that Rawls does not think this, and that he rejects desert because he thinks that we cannot tell what people deserve. I then offer a criticism of Rawls's rejection of desert based on its correct interpretation.



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Jeffrey Moriarty
Bentley University

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