Ratio 22 (1):19-40 (2009)

Seiriol Morgan
University of Bristol
In On What Matters Derek Parfit argues that we need to make a significant reassessment of the relationship between some central positions in moral philosophy, because, contrary to received opinion, Kantians, contractualists and consequentialists are all 'climbing the same mountain on different sides'. In Parfit's view Kant's own attempt to outline an account of moral obligation fails, but when it is modified in ways entirely congenial to his thinking, a defensible Kantian contractualism can be produced, which survives the objections which are fatal for Kant's own theory. This form of contractualism would then lead rational agents to choose consequentialist moral principles. I argue that Parfit significantly misrepresents Kant's project in moral philosophy, and that no genuinely Kantian moral theory could issue in a form of consequentialism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2008.00416.x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,078
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Kant, Eudaimonism, Act-Consequentialism and the Fact of Reason.Martin Sticker - 2020 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 102 (2):209-241.
A Kantian Solution to the Problem of Imperceptible Differences.Maike Albertzart - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):837-851.
In Search of the Trinity: A Dilemma for Parfit’s Conciliatory Project.Marius Baumann - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (4):999-1018.
Parfit Und Kant Über Vernünftige Zustimmung ​.Martin Sticker - 2016 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):221-254.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
237 ( #46,113 of 2,498,795 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #279,813 of 2,498,795 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes