Phronesis 51 (3):195-229 (2006)

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Abstract
Although it is a commonplace that the "Protagoras" and the "Republic" present diffent views of akrasia, the nature of the difference is not well understood. I argue that the logic of the famous argument in the "Protagoras" turns just on two crucial assumptions: that desiring is having evaluative beliefs (or that valuing is desiring), and that no one can have contradictory preferences at the same time; hedonism is not essential to the logic of the argument. And the logic of the argument for the division of the soul in the "Republic" requires the rejection of just the second of these assumptions, but not the evaluative conception of desire. I also maintain that Plato was aware, at the time of composition, of these features of the argumentation of his dialogues. Finally, I argue that there is reason to think that, even at the time of the "Protagoras," Plato held the conception of the soul expressed in the "Republic," and not anything like that expressed in the famous argument of the "Protagoras." The Protagoras view, even without hedonism, is a poor expression of the thesis that virtue is knowledge
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DOI 10.1163/156852806778134072
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References found in this work BETA

Good and Evil.Peter Geach - 1956 - Analysis 17 (2):33 - 42.
Plato.Lane Cooper - 1939 - Philosophical Review 48 (6):650-651.

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The Spirited Part of the Soul in Plato's Timaeus.Josh Wilburn - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (4):627-652.

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