Thinking must be computation of the right kind

In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr. pp. 115-122 (2000)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue for a computational theory of thinking that does not eliminate the mind. In doing so, I will defend computationalism against the arguments of John Searle and James Fetzer, and briefly respond to other common criticisms

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James H. Moor
Dartmouth College

Citations of this work

The status and future of the Turing test.James H. Moor - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (1):77-93.

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