Abstract

The thesis analyses the interrelationship between the factors which caused the collapse of the Rhodesian republic in the period 1976-80. After an historical introduction, Chapter Three discusses the fundamental motivations of the whites' rebellion by employing the concept of a "siege culture". It argues that a collective cognitive dissonance prevented the majority of whites from forming a rational appraisal of their opponents' aims and threats. Chapter Four considers the impact of international pressures, particularly from South Africa. The repercussions of sanctions are examined in Chapter Five. Chapter Six contrasts the political and military strategies of the main antagonists and concludes that Rhodesia's fundamental political weakness was its lace of a comprehensive and coherent strategy. Chapter Seven examines the results of this deficiency and its impact on the direction of the war. It is argued that Rhodesians were in the process of being defeated militarily. Chapter Eight examines the attempts by a number of senior military and Intelligence personnel to reach a political settlement with the guerrillas so as to avert a military defeat. Rhodesia is defined as a "military-dependent" regime because of the growing influence of the military. The final chapter considers the interaction of the main causes of Rhodesia's collapse. The study concludes that, although the security forces fulfilled their tasks competently, the Rhodesian Front failed to provide adequate political direction, and thus the counter-insurgency campaign failed. The study also suggests areas of further research, particularly the relevance of the Rhodesian collapse to South Africa