The role of context in contextualism

Synthese 190 (12):2341-2366 (2013)
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Abstract

According to a view widely held by epistemic contextualists, the truth conditions of a knowledge claim depend on features of the context such as the presuppositions, interests and purposes of the conversational participants. Against this view, I defend an intentionalist account, according to which the truth conditions of a knowledge attribution are determined by the speaker’s intention. I show that an intentionalist version of contextualism has several advantages over its more widely accepted rival account

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Martin Montminy
University of Oklahoma

Citations of this work

What the metasemantics of "know" is not.Peter van Elswyk - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (1):69-82.
Epistemic contextualism defended.Robin McKenna - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):363-383.
Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach.Robin Mckenna - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):101-123.
Conversational Kinematics.Robin McKenna - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge. pp. 321-331.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Literal Meaning.François Récanati - 2002 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Elusive knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

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