Soft Libertarianism and the Value of Incompatibilist Control

Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (2):221-232 (2023)
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10.1007/s10790-021-09810-4

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Martin Montminy
University of Oklahoma

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Free will and luck: Reply to critics.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
Modest libertarianism.Randolph Clarke - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):21-46.
Free Will and Luck: Reply to Critics.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):195-210.
Modest libertarianism and practical reason.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):201-216.
Free will and luck: Précis.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153-155.

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