Manipulation and Degrees of Blameworthiness

The Journal of Ethics 22 (3-4):265-281 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We propose an original response to Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. This response combines a hard-line and a soft-line. Like hard-liners, we insist that the manipulated agent is blameworthy for his wrongdoing. However, like soft-liners, we maintain that there is a difference in blameworthiness between the manipulated agent and the non-manipulated one. The former is less blameworthy than the latter. This difference is due to the fact that it is more difficult for the manipulated agent to do the right thing. We explain how we can make sense of this notion of difficulty in terms of Fischer and Ravizza’s notion of reasons-responsiveness.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,654

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Responses to John Martin Fischer and Dana Nelkin. [REVIEW]Derk Pereboom - 2014 - Science, Religion and Culture 1 (3):218.
Softening Fischer’s Hard Compatibilism.C. P. Ragland - 2011 - Modern Schoolman 88 (1-2):51-71.
A maneuver around the modified manipulation argument.Hannah Tierney - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):753-763.
Unavoidable Blameworthiness.Bryan G. Wiebe - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:275-283.
Unavoidable Blameworthiness.Bryan G. Wiebe - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:275-283.
The Soft-Line Solution to Pereboom's Four-Case Argument.Kristin Mickelson - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):595-617.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-09-10

Downloads
49 (#283,932)

6 months
7 (#173,776)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Martin Montminy
University of Oklahoma

Citations of this work

Reasons‐sensitivity and degrees of free will.Alex Kaiserman - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):687-709.
Reasons‐sensitivity and degrees of free will.Alex Kaiserman - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):687-709.
Degrees of Epistemic Criticizability.Cameron Boult - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.

View all 39 references / Add more references