Vision and abstraction: an empirical refutation of Nico Orlandi’s non-cognitivism

Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):365-373 (2016)
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This article argues against the non-cognitivist theory of vision that has been formulated in the work of Nico Orlandi. It shows that, if we understand ‘representation’ in the way Orlandi recommends, then the visual system’s response to abstract regularities must involve the formation of representations. Recent experiments show that those representations must be used by the visual system in the production of visual experiences. Their effects cannot be explained by taking them to be non-visual effects involving attention or memory. This contradicts Orlandi’s version of the non-cognitivist hypothesis, but does so while vindicating her methodological position



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Christopher Mole
University of British Columbia

References found in this work

Seeing absence.Anna Farennikova - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):429-454.
Representation-hunger reconsidered.Jan Degenaar & Erik Myin - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3639-3648.
Anti-representationalism and the dynamical stance.Anthony Chemero - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):625-647.
Neural representations not needed - no more pleas, please.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):241-256.
A Systems-Neuroscience View of Attention.Christian C. Ruff - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 1.

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