The Elements : Properties

In Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press (2003)
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Abstract

This chapter gives a broad description of the nature of properties and explains the foundations of metaphysics. It provides general statements about properties and how they describe parts of a metaphysical environment. These properties are used to develop the theory of causal powers. The chapter also attempts to address the ‘rights’ and ‘wrongs’ of nominalism and realism, including selective realism and its properties. The chapter also introduces conceptual distinctions such as derivative-basic, first-order-higher-order, simple-complex, essential-necessary-accidental, extrinsic-intrinsic, and transferable-non-transferrable. Secondary definitions are also given.

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