Philosophical Studies 135 (2):255 - 277 (2007)
AbstractWilliamson (2000) [Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues that attempts to substitute narrow mental states or narrow/environmental composites for broad and factive mental states will result in poorer explanations of behavior. I resist Williamson
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References found in this work
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hillary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Citations of this work
Persistent Burglars and Knocks on Doors: Causal Indispensability of Knowing Vindicated.Artūrs Logins - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy:1– 23.
Extended Minds and Prime Mental Conditions: Probing the Parallels.Zoe Drayson - 2018 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Spyridon Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 147-161.
Perceiving as Knowing in the Predictive Mind.Daniel Munro - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1177-1203.
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