Primeness, internalism and explanatory generality

Philosophical Studies 135 (2):255 - 277 (2007)
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Abstract

Williamson (2000) [Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues that attempts to substitute narrow mental states or narrow/environmental composites for broad and factive mental states will result in poorer explanations of behavior. I resist Williamson

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Bernard Molyneux
University of California, Davis

Citations of this work

Knowledge and mentality.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):359-382.
Belief is prior to knowledge.David Rose - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):385-399.
Perceiving as knowing in the predictive mind.Daniel Munro - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1177-1203.
Extended minds and prime mental conditions: probing the parallels.Zoe Drayson - 2018 - In Carter Joseph Adam, Clark Andy, Kallestrup Jesper, Palermos Spyridon Orestis & Pritchard Duncan (eds.), Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 147-161.

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References found in this work

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.

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