South African Journal of Philosophy 39 (2): 194-207 (2020)

Authors
Motsamai Molefe
University of Witwatersrand
Abstract
This article proffers a personhood-based conception of a meaningful life. I look into the ethical structure of the salient idea of personhood in African philosophy to develop an account of a meaningful life. In my view, the ethics of personhood is constituted by three components, namely (1) the fact of being human, which informs (2) a view of moral status qua the capacity for moral virtue, and (3) which specifies the final good of achieving or developing a morally virtuous character. In light of the ethics of personhood, I will propose the view that a meaningful life is a function of achieving moral excellence or perfection. The moral perfection proposed here, to embody a meaningful life, is of a deontological and satisficing kind. The achievement of satisfactory levels of moral excellence, within sociopolitical and moral limits, captures the essence of a meaningful life. I conclude the article by considering objections against the view proposed here.
Keywords Personhood  A Meaningful life  Dignity  Moral status  Deontology  African philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/02580136.2020.1774980
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Moral Saints.Susan Wolf - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (8):419-439.
Two Distinctions in Goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
Toward an African Moral Theory.Thaddeus Metz - 2007 - Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (3):321–341.
Speciesism and Moral Status.Peter Singer - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (3-4):567-581.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

African Personhood and Applied Ethics.Motsamai Molefe - 2020 - Grahamstown, South Africa: NISC.
The Function of “It” in Ifeanyi Menkiti’s Normative Account of Personhood: A Response to Bernard Matolino.Molefe Motsamai & Maraganedzha Mutshidzi - 2017 - Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 6 (1):90-109.
On the Notion of Moral Status and Personhood in Biomedical Ethics.Azam Golam - 2010 - The Dhaka Univrsity Studies 67 (1):83-96.
Personhood and Moral Status.Julie Tannenbaum & Agnieszka Jaworska - 2019 - In Antonia LoLordo (ed.), Persons: A History. Oxford University Press. pp. 334-362.
Critical Comments on Afro-Communitarianism: The Community Versus Individual.Molefe Motsamai - 2017 - Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 6 (1):1-22.
Radical Versus Moderate Communitarianism: Gyekye’s and Matolino’s Misinterpretations of Menkiti.Polycarp Ikuenobe - 2018 - Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7 (2):79-100.
African Communal Basis for Autonomy and Life Choices.Polycarp Ikuenobe - 2018 - Developing World Bioethics 18 (3):212-221.
Moral Force and the “It-It” in Menkiti’s Normative Conception of Personhood.Edwin Etieyibo - 2018 - Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7 (2):47-60.
A Meaningful Life.John Shand - 2019 - Human Affairs 29 (4):434-444.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-07-07

Total views
420 ( #22,662 of 2,497,794 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
161 ( #3,666 of 2,497,794 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes