Intended and Unintended Mathematics: The Case of the Lagrange Multipliers

Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):93-113 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We can distinguish between two different ways in which mathematics is applied in science: when mathematics is introduced and developed in the context of a particular scientific application; when mathematics is used in the context of a particular scientific application but it has been developed independently from that application. Nevertheless, there might also exist intermediate cases in which mathematics is developed independently from an application but it is nonetheless introduced in the context of that particular application. In this paper I present a case study, that of the Lagrange multipliers, which concerns such type of intermediate application. I offer a reconstruction of how Lagrange developed the method of multipliers and I argue that the philosophical significance of this case-study analysis is twofold. In the context of the applicability debate, my historically-driven considerations pull towards the reasonable effectiveness of mathematics in science. Secondly, I maintain that the practice of applying the same mathematical result in different scientific settings can be regarded as a form of crosschecking that contributes to the objectivity of a mathematical result.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Mathematical nominalism and measurement.Davide Rizza - 2010 - Philosophia Mathematica 18 (1):53-73.
An anti-realist account of the application of mathematics.Otávio Bueno - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2591-2604.
Confirmational holism and its mathematical (w)holes.Anthony Peressini - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):102-111.
Philosophy of mathematics: Making a fresh start.Carlo Cellucci - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):32-42.
Literalism and the applicability of arithmetic.L. Luce - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (4):469-489.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-10-25

Downloads
20 (#744,405)

6 months
3 (#1,023,809)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

Naturalism in mathematics.Penelope Maddy - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Truth Without Objectivity.Max Kölbel - 2002 - London and New York: Routledge.
What is Mathematical Truth?Hilary Putnam - 1975 - In Mathematics, Matter and Method. Cambridge University Press. pp. 60--78.

View all 23 references / Add more references