The Mirage of Falsemakers

Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):19-35 (2015)
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Abstract

The truthmaker principle faces a number of problems, including that of negative truths. Lewis, among others, tries to solve the problem of negative truths by appealing to falsemakers. In this paper, firstly I argue that certain steps of Lewis's argument for the equivalence of the truthmaker and the falsemaker principles are unjustified, and then I suggest a new argument for this equivalence. Secondly, I argue that Lewis's characterization of the falsemaker principle is not appropriate and then I suggest my own characterization of it. Thirdly, I argue that appealing to falsemakers will not solve the problem.

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Mohsen Zamani
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences

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