Authors
Andreas Mogensen
Oxford University
Abstract
Many philosophers believe that there exist distinctive obstacles to relying on moral testimony. In this paper, I criticize previous attempts to identify these obstacles and offer a new theory. I argue that the problems associated with moral deference can't be explained in terms of the value of moral understanding, nor in terms of aretaic considerations related to subjective integration. Instead, our uneasiness with moral testimony is best explained by our attachment to an ideal of authenticity that places special demands on our moral beliefs.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12255
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,979
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

View all 62 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Moral Testimony: Transmission Versus Propagation.Alison Hills - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):399-414.
Why Don't We Trust Moral Testimony?James Andow - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (4):456-474.
A Defense of the Very Idea of Moral Deference Pessimism.Max Lewis - 2020 - Philosophical Studies (8):2323-2340.
Moral Understanding and Cooperative Testimony.Kenneth Boyd - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):18-33.
What Pessimism About Moral Deference Means for Disagreement.James Fritz - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):121-136.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Moral Deference and Authentic Interaction.Knut Olav Skarsaune - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (7):346-357.
Moral Testimony and its Authority.Philip Nickel - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):253-266.
What is Wrong with Moral Testimony?Robert Hopkins - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):611-634.
Moral Testimony.Alison Hills - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (6):552-559.
In Defense of Moral Testimony.Paulina Sliwa - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):175-195.
Moral Dependence: Reliance on Moral Testimony.Philip James Nickel - 2002 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
The Moral Obligations of Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):332-345.
Virtue Ethics and Being Morally Moved.Qingjie Wang - 2010 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 9 (3):309-321.
Aesthetic Testimony.Jon Robson - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (1):1-10.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-11-25

Total views
197 ( #59,022 of 2,504,868 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #50,004 of 2,504,868 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes