Abstract
Aristotle's discussion of corrective justice has been generally thought to mark the beginning of the philosophical examination of tort law. In addition, many scholars consider corrective justice, of one form or another, the main normative alternative to the economic analysis of law for explaining not only tort law but also private law and law in general. Most discussions of Aristotle’s conception of corrective justice in the law review literature, however, have failed to account for the established reading of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics as proposing a teleological form of ethics. Accordingly, Corrective Justice and the Revival of Judicial Virtue argues for a teleological interpretation of Aristotle's conception of corrective justice. The teleological conception of corrective justice does not attempt to analyze corrective justice merely as a formal (Weinrib), substantive (Wright), or political (Heyman) conception of equality or freedom that can be applied by technical reason to various circumstances. Rather, it maintains that corrective justice is a moral virtue of the judge that cannot be fully understood without specifying its relationship to practical wisdom and the telos of the good life. Under this reading, Aristotle’s conception of corrective justice specifies a method of judicial decision making whereby only the practically wise (i.e., morally virtuous) judge can know the content of corrective justice in all cases. Judging requires moral virtue not technical, philosophical or legal, expertise. Consequently, this article advocates a revival of Aristotle’s notion that judicial virtue requires moral virtue.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,436
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
40 ( #285,832 of 2,520,403 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #405,718 of 2,520,403 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes