Are there rival, incommensurable theories?

Philosophy of Science 46 (2):244-262 (1979)
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Abstract

Following an account of the incommensurability argument, an objection, based on assumptions concerning rival theories, is examined and rejected. This rejection leads to an alternative direction of criticism of incommensurability, a direction that involves the articulation of comparative standards of theory evaluation that are independent of meaning invariance

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Citations of this work

Paul Feyerabend.John Preston - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Paradigms.Daniel Goldman Cedarbaum - 1983 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 14 (3):173-213.

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References found in this work

Against Method.P. Feyerabend - 1975 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (4):331-342.
Theory change and the indeterminacy of reference.Hartry Field - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):462-481.
On reduction.John Kemeny & Paul Oppenheim - 1956 - Philosophical Studies 7 (1-2):6 - 19.
Science and Subjectivity.Israel Scheffler - 1968 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):176-177.

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