Abstract

After the monumental works of Xavier Leon and Martial Guéroult, the French have again produced a significant piece of Fichte-interpretation. The author advances two radically new theses: Fichte's philosophy is above all centered around the deduction of the other, and even objectivity as such is based upon inter-subjectivity. The Doctrine of Science, instead of being the foundation of an absolute idealism, teaches that the only knowledge which can be had is empirical knowledge, and all logic is rooted in time. Philonenko claims that Fichte's aim was to uphold the adequacy and essential correctness of common everyday knowledge over against the pretensions of metaphysical speculation. This is a magnificent book: the product of a truly amazing scholarship in the history of philosophy, full of ingenious and highly imaginative rapprochements and insights. It is also another welcome manifestation of that recent continental trend in the interpretation of German idealism which realizes that Fichte and Schelling do not simply fill the gap between Kant and Hegel, but are great philosophers in their own right. If any objection can be made at all against the work, it would be the limitation of its argument to the first period of Fichte's creativity. The author's avowed aim is to confine himself to the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, and, as a matter of fact, we rarely find a quote later than 1798. Indeed, Fichte always claimed that no qualitative change took place in his thought. However, his exposition of it steadily altered, and in view of this, perhaps it is not entirely unjustified to regret that the Wissenschaftslehre of 1804 and the Answeisung zum seligen Leben are not taken into account in interpreting the early Fichte.—M. J. V.