Social Epistemology 29 (4):361-378 (2015)

Authors
Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that there is neither valid deductive support nor strong inductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis. There is no valid deductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis because, from the fact that the reference of the same kind terms changes or discontinues from one theoretical framework to another, it does not necessarily follow that these two theoretical frameworks are taxonomically incommensurable. There is no strong inductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis, since there are rebutting defeaters against it in the form of episodes from the history of science that do not exhibit discontinuity and replacement, as Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis predicts, but rather continuity and supplementation. If this is correct, then there are no compelling epistemic reasons to believe that Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis is true or probable
Keywords incommensurability  lexical taxonomy  scientific change  scientific revolution  Thomas Kuhn
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Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1080/02691728.2014.922635
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The History of Science as a Graveyard of Theories: A Philosophers’ Myth?Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):263-278.

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