Jonathan Mitchell
Cardiff University
According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co-presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential-presence in terms of a form of non-intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non-intentional experiential-presence, are considered and are shown to encounter significant problems. The fact that a plausible account of the non-intentional awareness which experience putatively has of itself cannot be framed with reference to such forms of awareness is grounds for scepticism concerning the cogency of non-intentional experiential presence.
Keywords Consciousness  Self-consciousness  Experience  Intentionality  Pre-reflective  Phenomenology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12804
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Self-Intimation.Galen Strawson - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):1-31.
Intentionality, Consciousness, and Subjectivity.Thomas Natsoulas - 1992 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (3):281-308.
From the Inside: Consciousness and the First‐Person Perspective.Mark Rowlands - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):281 – 297.
Varieties of Self-Apprehension.Anna Giustina - 2019 - In Marc Borner, Manfred Frank & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Senses of Self: Approaches to Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. pp. 186-220.
Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 157-180.
Intentionality and Experience.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):299-318.


Added to PP index

Total views
156 ( #70,745 of 2,463,161 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
46 ( #19,258 of 2,463,161 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes