Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):524-546 (2020)

Jonathan Mitchell
Cardiff University
According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.
Keywords Experience  Introspection  Emotion  Transparency  Attitude  Phenomenal Character
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqz085
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The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2635-2663.
The Structure of Phenomenal Justification.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

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