Is Multiple Realizability a Valid Argument against Methodological Individualism?

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (1):28-43 (2017)
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Abstract

In recent decades, a number of authors have relied on the multiple realizability argument to reject methodological individualism. In this article, I argue that this strategy results in serious difficulties and makes it impossible to identify social entities and phenomena.

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References found in this work

Special sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.

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