Tractatus 5.1362

Philosophical Inquiries 5 (1):27-32 (2017)
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Abstract

The paper analyzes the conception of free will defended by the Tractatus, and in contrast to Pasquale Frascolla’s recent verificationist reading of 5.1362, it argues that Wittgenstein’s conception of free will squarely places future contingencies within the boundaries of truth-conditional semantics.

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