Abstract
This chapter attempts to explain why people become confused by questions about the relation between mental and physical events. When a question leads to confused, inconsistent answers, this may be because the question is ultimately meaningless or at least unanswerable, but it may also be because an adequate answer requires a powerful analytical apparatus. It is the author's view that many important questions about the relation between mind and brain are of that second kind, and that some of the necessary technical and conceptual tools are becoming available as a result of work on the problems of making computer programs behave intelligently. We shall suggest a theory to explain why introspection does not give clear answers to these questions. Technical solutions to the questions will not be attempted, but there is probably some value in finding at least a clear explanation of why we are confused.
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The Structure of Scientific Theories.Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Logical Foundations for Belief Representation.William Rapaport - 1986 - Cognitive Science 10 (4):371-422.
The Geometry of Partial Understanding.Colin Allen - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):249-262.
An Alternative to Working on Machine Consciousness.Aaron Sloman - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):1-18.

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