Matter, mind and models

Abstract

This chapter attempts to explain why people become confused by questions about the relation between mental and physical events. When a question leads to confused, inconsistent answers, this may be because the question is ultimately meaningless or at least unanswerable, but it may also be because an adequate answer requires a powerful analytical apparatus. It is the author's view that many important questions about the relation between mind and brain are of that second kind, and that some of the necessary technical and conceptual tools are becoming available as a result of work on the problems of making computer programs behave intelligently. We shall suggest a theory to explain why introspection does not give clear answers to these questions. Technical solutions to the questions will not be attempted, but there is probably some value in finding at least a clear explanation of why we are confused.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
103 (#163,960)

6 months
16 (#138,396)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

The Structure of Scientific Theories.Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
An alternative to working on machine consciousness.Aaron Sloman - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):1-18.
The Geometry of Partial Understanding.Colin Allen - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):249-262.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references