Skepticism and Moral Justification

The Monist 76 (3):379-393 (1993)
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The moral skeptic challenges us to show that we are justified in accepting certain moral judgments rather than others; for the skeptic doubts that any rational basis can be found for such preferences. Theories of moral justification attempt to answer this challenge by specifying some procedure by means of which moral judgments can be justified.



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