Rorty and moral relativism

European Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):354–374 (2002)
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Critics of Rorty’s views on truth, objectivity, and value often take them to imply some form of untenable relativism.1 While it would be worthwhile to investigate whether Rorty is in fact committed to what might be called global relativism, or relativism in most if not all domains of investigation, for our purposes in this paper we must proceed more selectively. By focusing on Rorty’s view of moral objectivity, we can hopefully shed some new light on the now stale charge of Rortian relativism. In the process, we can also go quite a long way towards articulating what a Rortian approach to meta-ethics might look like.



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Christian Miller
Wake Forest University

Citations of this work

The Conditions of Moral Realism.Christian Miller - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:123-155.
Does Rorty’s Pragmatism Undermine Itself?James Tartaglia - 2012 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 4 (1):284-301.
Notes from the Playground.Maura Striano - 2020 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 12 (1).

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