On Gödel Sentences and What They Say

Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2):193-226 (2007)
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Abstract

Proofs of Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem are often accompanied by claims such as that the gödel sentence constructed in the course of the proof says of itself that it is unprovable and that it is true. The validity of such claims depends closely on how the sentence is constructed. Only by tightly constraining the means of construction can one obtain gödel sentences of which it is correct, without further ado, to say that they say of themselves that they are unprovable and that they are true; otherwise a false theory can yield false gödel sentences

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Peter Milne
University of Stirling

Citations of this work

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There May Be Many Arithmetical Gödel Sentences.Kaave Lajevardi & Saeed Salehi - 2021 - Philosophia Mathematica 29 (2):278–287.
Alethic Reference.Lavinia Picollo - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (3):417-438.

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References found in this work

Mathematical Logic.Joseph R. Shoenfield - 1967 - Reading, MA, USA: Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Pub. Co..
Computability and Logic.George S. Boolos, John P. Burgess & Richard C. Jeffrey - 2003 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (4):520-521.
Computability and Logic.George S. Boolos, John P. Burgess & Richard C. Jeffrey - 1974 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

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