Mind 118 (471):647-712 (2009)
AbstractThe ‘New Hume’ interpretation, which sees Hume as a realist about ‘thick’ Causal powers, has been largely motivated by his evident commitment to causal language and causal science. In this, however, it is fundamentally misguided, failing to recognise how Hume exploits his anti-realist conclusions about (upper-case) Causation precisely to support (lower-case) causal science. When critically examined, none of the standard New Humean arguments — familiar from the work of Wright, Craig, Strawson, Buckle, Kail, and others — retains any significant force against the plain evidence of Hume's; texts. But the most devastating objection comes from Hume's own applications of his analysis of causation, to the questions of ‘the immateriality of the soul’ and ‘liberty and necessity’. These show that the New Hume interpretation has misunderstood the entire purpose of his ‘Chief Argument’, and presented him as advocating some of the very positions he is arguing most strongly against
Similar books and articles
Resemblance-based resources for reductive singularism (or: How to be a Humean singularist about causation).Jessica Wilson - 2009 - The Monist 92 (1):153-190.
Conceivability and modality in Hume: A lemma in an argument in defense of skeptical realism.Peter Kail - 2003 - Hume Studies 29 (1):43--61.
Causal necessity and logical necessity.David H. Sanford - 1978 - Philosophical Studies 33 (2):185 - 194.
Why History Matters: Associations and Causal Judgment in Hume and Cognitive Science.Mark Collier - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (3):175-188.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Hume's Fork, and his Theory of Relations.Peter Millican - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):3-65.
Hume's Scepticism and Realism.Jani Hakkarainen - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):283-309.
The Science in Hume's Science of Man.Tamás Demeter - 2020 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 18 (3):257-271.