Abstract

A curious feature of this fifth volume in Routledge’s Environmental Philosophies series is the fact that, in 1987, co-editor Eric Katz argued that “a workable environmental ethic... cannot ultimately rest on the values of pragmatism, for these values are inextricably bound up with human desires and interests”. In contrast to the anthropocentric subjectivism of pragmatism, several decades of environmental thought have taught us to see ourselves as fellow members of a wider biotic community, with which we have much in common, including a shared evolutionary history and a high degree of interdependence. Recognizing these facts, we can come to respect the interests and good of non-human members as well as our own. For example, in 1973 Richard Routley proposed the “last man” test for our moral intuitions: Would it be morally indifferent for the last person on earth to destroy all other living things if it were certain there would be no further humans to experience, need, or enjoy them? No, says Routley, it would be a moral crime; and, thus, we need an account of environmental values that is not forced into the mould of human chauvinism. Is not, then, “environmental pragmatism” an oxy- moron?