Cognition and community: the Scottish philosophical context of the 'divided self'

Janus Head: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature, Continental Philosophy, Phenomenological Psychology and the Arts 4 (1):104-129 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article aims to place the work of R.D. Laing into the context of Scottish history of ideas. It is possible to clarify and strengthen Laing’s arguments by situating them alongside the work of Scottish philosophers such as David Hume, J. B. Baillie and John Macmurray. In particular, it can be shown that Laing is not philosophically naïve. Philosophy – and this is readily apparent in Hume’s account of human nature – tends to say that we are indeed divided selves. The work of Baillie and Macmurray helps to defend Laing from the charge that the "divided self" is, in truth, the logically inevitable account of human being. The study of Laing’s Scottish precursors also has a further consequence. The side of Laing that values social relations emerges in greater clarity, and in greater consonance with his sympathy for the marginalised and the alienated

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

From Cambridge Platonism to Scottish Sentimentalism.Michael B. Gill - 2010 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (1):13-31.
The story of Scottish philosophy.Daniel Sommer Robinson - 1961 - New York,: Exposition Press.
Scottish Kantians: An Exploration.J. H. Burns - 2009 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 7 (2):115-131.
Is community necessary? Quasi-philosophical ruminations.C. J. B. Macmillan - 1996 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 15 (1):77-88.
Patriotism or Integrity? Constitutional Community in Divided Societies.Alex Schwartz - 2011 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31 (3):503-526.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-01-19

Downloads
10 (#1,025,836)

6 months
3 (#445,838)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references