Bare Functional Desire

Abstract

But this changes nothing. The decisive claim is that in assessing the counterfactuals implicit in (A) we do not have to take sceptical worlds into the reckoning, whereas we must do that in assessing (B) because (B) explicitly speaks of them. Accept, provisionally, what is here said about (B) and focus on the claim about (A). Nobody should make it unless they are already in a position to assert that the actual world is not a sceptical world. And with that we are back to the choice between impotence and redundancy.

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Alexander Miller
New York University

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