Biology and Philosophy 30 (5):709-728 (2015)

Marcin Miłkowski
Polish Academy of Sciences
The purpose of this paper is to present a general mechanistic framework for analyzing causal representational claims, and offer a way to distinguish genuinely representational explanations from those that invoke representations for honorific purposes. It is usually agreed that rats are capable of navigation because they maintain a cognitive map of their environment. Exactly how and why their neural states give rise to mental representations is a matter of an ongoing debate. I will show that anticipatory mechanisms involved in rats’ evaluation of possible routes give rise to satisfaction conditions of contents, and this is why they are representationally relevant for explaining and predicting rats’ behavior. I argue that a naturalistic account of satisfaction conditions of contents answers the most important objections of antirepresentationalists
Keywords Representation  Antirepresentationalism  Hard Problem of Content  Satisfaction conditions  Cognitive map  Anticipatory representation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10539-015-9481-3
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
The Predictive Mind.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Oxford University Press UK.

View all 37 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Hard Problem Of Content: Solved (Long Ago).Marcin Miłkowski - 2015 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 41 (1):73-88.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
217 ( #51,403 of 2,498,009 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #56,058 of 2,498,009 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes