Elizabeth Spelman, Gender Realism, and Women

Hypatia 21 (4):77-96 (2001)
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Abstract

Spelman has famously argued against gender realism (the view that women have some social feature in common that makes them women). Many feminist philosophers have accepted Spelman’s argument and gender realist positions are, generally speaking, rejected. I show that Spelman’s arguments are inadequate and do not give good reasons to reject gender realism per se. I also propose a gender realist position that makes use of David Armstrong’s work on complex universals.

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Mari Mikkola
University of Amsterdam

Citations of this work

Gender and Gender Terms.Elizabeth Barnes - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):704-730.
Feminist perspectives on sex and gender.Mari Mikkola - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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Different Women. Gender and the Realism-Nominalism Debate.Natalie Stoljar - 2011 - In Charlotte Witt (ed.), Feminist Metaphysics. Springer Verlag. pp. 27--46.
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