Abstract

The article describes the features of the relationship between Soviet power and engineering specialists, who was working in senior positions in factories and mines of theDonbasin the early 1920's. Interaction between professionals and the new government in that time was inconsistent and compromised. On the one hand, technical specialist received significant preferences and opportunities, regardless of their relationship to the Soviet authorities. This decision was based on the rational considerations about the impossibility of restoring the destroyed industry ofDonbasonly by party instructions, without relying on a professional understanding of the fundamental aspects of the industry. On the other hand, the local party members, their leaders and the working class began pressure on the specialist, because they not understood the rationalist motivation of power and evaluated this policy as a betrayal of conquests of the revolution. The article presents a previously unknown secret document, which demonstrates that in the early 1920's the Soviet authorities in their policy in theDonbasmade a bid for the segmentation of the group of engineering specialists. "Sovietization" of professionals should be the result of internal contradictions and competition in mid group. In the same document founded the practice of detailed surveillance specialists. Later this information about specialists was used as the base for charges during the "spetseedovskie" processes at the late 1920's -1930's.