Philosophy in Review 24 (3):220-222 (2004)
Abstract |
In Descartes' Cogito, Saved from the Great Shipwreck, Husain Sarkar convincingly argues that the Cartesian cogito as it appears in Meditation Two cannot be an argument but must be understood as an intuition emerging from the process of ('extraordinary') doubt. Sarkar mentions in the Preface that only the negative part of his thesis in intended to be decisive (X). However, as the book unfolds it becomes evident that his "positive" effort, his interpretation of the cogito as an intuition although not decisive, is no less important. Sarkar shows how his reading of the cogito can account for other aspects of Descartes' writings (memory, the will, the theory of deduction) and offers this as further proof for the correctness of his interpretation.
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Keywords | Descartes, cogito |
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