Abstract

The attacks on historicism by radical individualists such as Popper and Mises have had lasting repercussions in the social sciences. Specifically, the term is used to connote deterministic, teleological theories of history, associated with Hegelian notions of destiny and positivist ideas of historical laws. This article argues that historicism is very different in character, in that it essentially amounts to the belief that social science and history are one and the same, whilst emphasizing the separate epis temology of natural science. It rejects the fictitious historicism invented by Popper in his famous polemic, and challenges the idea of a value- free social science posited by Mises, who saw history and human action as logically distinct entities. In conclusion, it is argued that the mecha nistic rationalism that characterizes much of social science, particularly modern economics, should be supplementary, if anything, to the primacy of history. The notion of transcendent, value-free criteria upon which to construct social science is refuted