Mind and Language (forthcoming)

Eliot Michaelson
King's College London
According to what is perhaps the dominant picture of reference, what a referential term refers to in a context is determined by what the speaker intends for her audience to identify as the referent. I argue that this sort of broadly Gricean view entails, counterintuitively, that it is impossible to knowingly use referential terms in ways that one expects or intends to be misunderstood. Then I sketch an alternative which can better account for such opaque uses of language, or what I call “sneaky reference.” I close by reflecting on the ramifications of these arguments for the theory of meaning more broadly.
Keywords metasemantics  obfuscation  demonstratives  names  speaker's meaning
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12349
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References found in this work BETA

Meaning.H. Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
On Referring.Peter F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.
Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (3):339.
Names Are Predicates.Delia Graff Fara - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):59-117.
Afterthoughts.David Kaplan - 1989 - In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 565-614.

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Citations of this work BETA

No Context, No Content, No Problem.Ethan Nowak - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (2):189-220.
Pragmatic Particularism.Ray Buchanan & Henry Ian Schiller - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
A Defence of Intentionalism About Demonstratives.Alex Radulescu - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4): 775-791.

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