Make-Believe and Model-Based Representation in Science: The Epistemology of Frigg’s and Toon’s Fictionalist Views of Modeling

Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):201-218 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Roman Frigg and Adam Toon, both, defend a fictionalist view of scientific modeling. One fundamental thesis of their view is that scientists are participating in games of make-believe when they study models in order to learn about the models themselves and about target systems represented by the models. In this paper, the epistemology of these two fictionalist views is critically discussed. I will argue that both views can give an explanation of how scientists learn about models they are studying. However, how the use of models can foster an understanding of target systems is not sufficiently accounted for by Frigg and Toon.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,252

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Models as make-believe.Adam Toon - 2010 - In Roman Frigg & Matthew Hunter (eds.), Beyond Mimesis and Convention: Representation in Art and Science. Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science.
Playing with molecules.Adam Toon - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (4):580-589.
Representation and Similarity: Suárez on Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Scientific Representation.Michael Poznic - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (2):331-347.
Modeling without models.Arnon Levy - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):781-798.
Scientific representation.Roman Frigg & James Nguyen - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-04-21

Downloads
51 (#300,335)

6 months
6 (#448,852)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Poznic
Universität Karlsruhe

Citations of this work

The philosophy of the metaverse.Melvin Chen - 2023 - Ethics and Information Technology 25 (3):1-13.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Mimesis as Make-Believe.Kendall L. Walton - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):413-434.
Models and fiction.Roman Frigg - 2010 - Synthese 172 (2):251-268.
Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.Kendall L. Walton - 1990 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 49 (2):161-166.

View all 12 references / Add more references