Make-Believe and Model-Based Representation in Science: The Epistemology of Frigg’s and Toon’s Fictionalist Views of Modeling

Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):201-218 (2016)
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Abstract

Roman Frigg and Adam Toon, both, defend a fictionalist view of scientific modeling. One fundamental thesis of their view is that scientists are participating in games of make-believe when they study models in order to learn about the models themselves and about target systems represented by the models. In this paper, the epistemology of these two fictionalist views is critically discussed. I will argue that both views can give an explanation of how scientists learn about models they are studying. However, how the use of models can foster an understanding of target systems is not sufficiently accounted for by Frigg and Toon.

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Michael Poznic
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

The philosophy of the metaverse.Melvin Chen - 2023 - Ethics and Information Technology 25 (3):1-13.
Two senses of representation in science.Quentin Ruyant - 2025 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 39 (3):353-371.

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