Synthese 199 (3-4):7477-7507 (2021)

Authors
Kourken Michaelian
Université Grenoble Alpes
Abstract
Philosophers of memory have approached the relationship between memory and imagination from two very different perspectives. Advocates of the causal theory of memory, on the one hand, have motivated their preferred theory by appealing to the intuitive contrast between successfully remembering an event and merely imagining it. Advocates of the simulation theory, on the other hand, have motivated their preferred theory by appealing to empirical evidence for important similarities between remembering the past and imagining the future. Recently, causalists have argued that simulationism is unable to accommodate the difference between successful remembering and forms of unsuccessful remembering or mere imagining such as confabulating. This paper argues that, while these arguments fail, simulationism, in its current form, is indeed unable to provide a fully adequate account of unsuccessful remembering. Rather than suggesting a return to causalism, the paper proposes a new form of simulationism, a virtue theory of memory modelled not on the process reliabilist epistemology that has so far served as the inspiration for the simulation theory but instead on virtue reliabilist epistemology, and shows that this new theory grounds a more adequate account of unsuccessful remembering.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-021-03125-4
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,039
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is Justified Belief?Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
Memory: A Self-Referential Account.Jordi Fernández - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.

View all 59 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Remembering, Imagining, and Memory Traces: Toward a Continuist Causal Theory.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - In Christopher McCarroll, Kourken Michaelian & Andre Sant'Anna (eds.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory. Routledge.
Remembering and Imagining: The Attitudinal Continuity.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - In Anja Berninger & Íngrid Vendrell Ferran (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination. London: Routledge.
Remembering Emotions.Urim Retkoceri - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (5):1-26.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What Sort of Imagining Might Remembering Be?Peter Langland-Hassan - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (2):231-251.
Imagining the Past: On the Nature of Episodic Memory.Robert Hopkins - 2018 - In Fiona MacPherson Fabian Dorsch (ed.), Memory and Imagination. Oxford University Press.
Is the Simulation Theory of Memory About Simulation?Nikola Andonovski - 2019 - Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia 10 (3):37.
The Empiricist Theory of Memory.R. F. Holland - 1954 - Mind 63 (October):464-86.
Remembering the Past and Imagining the Actual.Daniel Munro - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2).
The Roots of Remembering: Radically Enactive Recollecting.Daniel D. Hutto & Anco Peeters - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 97-118.
Beyond the Causal Theory? Fifty Years After Martin and Deutscher.Kourken Michaelian & Sarah Robins - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. Routledge. pp. 13-32.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-04-04

Total views
33 ( #345,496 of 2,505,990 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #73,843 of 2,505,990 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes