Intuitions, reflective judgments, and experimental philosophy

Synthese 195 (9):4147-4168 (2018)
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Abstract

Experimental philosophers are often puzzled as to why many armchair philosophers question the philosophical significance of their research. Armchair philosophers, in contrast, are often puzzled as to why experimental philosophers think their work sheds any light on traditional philosophical problems. I argue there is truth on both sides.

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Michael Hannon
Nottingham University

References found in this work

The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Philosophy Without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

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