Chrysippus and the destruction of propositions: a defence of the standard interpretation

History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (1):1-12 (2001)
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Abstract

One of the most intriguing claims of Stoic logic is Chrysippus's denial of the modal principle that the impossible does not follow from the possible. Chrysippus's argument against this principle involves the idea that some propositions are ?destroyed? or ?perish?. According to the standard interpretation of Chrysippus's argument, propositions cease to exist when they are destroyed. Ide has presented an alternative interpretation according to which destroyed propositions persist after destruction and are false. I argue that Ide's alternative interpretation as well as some versions of the standard interpretation conflict with Stoic doctrines about the nature of propositions. I propose another version of the standard interpretation based on Frede's account of the Stoic theory of the proposition. I hold that this version of the standard interpretation both escapes Ide's objections and is consistent with Stoic logic and philosophy of language.

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Michael Papazian
Berry College

References found in this work

Outlines of Pyrrhonism.Sextus Empiricus - 2020 - Sententiae 39 (2):125-137.
Outlines of Pyrrhonism.Sextus Empiricus - 1990 - Harvard University Press. Edited by R. G. Bury.
The stoic notion of a lekton.Michael Frede - 1994 - In Stephen Everson (ed.), Language. Cambridge University Press. pp. 109--128.

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