The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility

Erkenntnis 84 (4):877-893 (2019)
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Abstract

In several papers (2013, 2014, 2015) Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic responsibility, viz. our responsibility for our beliefs, is grounded in a specific form of reasons-responsiveness. The main purpose of this paper is to show that a subject’s belief can be responsive to reasons in this specific way without the subject being responsible for her belief. While this specific form of reasons-responsiveness might be necessary, it is not sufficient for doxastic responsibility.

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10.1007/s10670-018-9985-8

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Anne Meylan
University of Zürich

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References found in this work

Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.
Controlling attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (3):551-551.
Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.

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