Knowledge is extrinsically apt belief. Virtue epistemology and the temporal objection

In Christoph Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press (2020)
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Anne Meylan
University of Zürich

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