Abstract

Political theorists and ethicists often rely on the idea of human dignity. Yet typically they conclude by simply invoking this popular concept rather than giving a full account of it. I offer an analysis of human dignity which begins by distinguishing Enlightenment views of human dignity from the once prevalent idea of a social dignity. This distinction provides the essential background for an interpretation of Kant's influential notion of the dignity of humanity. I explain the significance of the fact that Kant discusses dignity in the context of the realm of ends. Kant bases human dignity on retionality; I demonstrate in turn that dignity is not principally the characteristic value of a "good will," but rather of a will which self-legislates moral law. Following Kant's lead, I investigate human dignity by first analyzing human autonomy. My account of human dignity is based on the distinction I develop between rights-sensitive autonomy and stoic autonomy. Some contemporary thinkers err in maintaining that the dignity of human beings can be reduced to their capacity to claim rights. I argue instead that the fundamental basis of human dignity is the human capacity for self-control. Eschewing a narrow reading of self-control as either self-repression or self-sufficiency, I set forth a conception of human dignity as a human capacity for self-management, in particular a capacity for deliberative action