The subjectivity of subjective experience: A representationalist analysis of the first-person perspective

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Abstract

Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its ba- sic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be fed into the theoretical model as it grows and becomes more refined. This paper makes an attempt at sketching the outlines of such a theory, offering a representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person perspective. Three phenomenal target properties are centrally relevant

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Author's Profile

Thomas Metzinger
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz

References found in this work

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1988 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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