Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):651-668 (2020)

Authors
Joseph Metz
University of Arizona
Abstract
Moral responsibility requires that we are in control of what we do. Many contemporary accounts of responsibility cash out this control in terms of abilities and hold that the relevant abilities are strong abilities, like general abilities. This paper raises a problem for strong abilities views: an agent can plausibly be morally responsible for an action or omission, despite lacking any strong abilities to do the relevant thing. It then offers a way forward for ability‐based views, arguing that very weak abilities can form the basis of moral responsibility for both actions and omissions.
Keywords Omissions  Collective Omissions  Collective Action  Moral Responsibility  Abilities  Action Theory
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12323
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References found in this work BETA

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
Masked Abilities and Compatibilism.M. Fara - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):843-865.
Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account.Kadri Vihvelin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):427-450.
Two Faces of Intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.

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